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 Abstract
In current debates about climate change, the environment is often seen as 
a potential cause of violent conflicts. According to this view, environmental 
degradation will significantly increase the stress put on various societies, 
particularly in so-called weak and fragile states, and thereby cause political 
destabilisation and violence while jeopardising national and international 
security. Drawing on research conducted within the Swiss National Centre of 
Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South programme, this article shows 
that establishing such direct causal links is simplistic and reductionist. While 
recognising that climate change, and especially resource scarcity, can lead 
to violent conflict, we argue that, when trying to understand the relation-
ships between changes in the environment and violent conflict, it is crucial 
to put social and human dimensions at the centre of the analysis. Climate 
change may render human interaction and social regulation more difficult, 
but it will hardly ever directly affect the probability of violence. Climate pol-
icy will not bring about peace any more than peace policy will improve the 
climate. In other words, the missing link in current debates about environ-
mental conflicts is the key role played by political, social, and cultural insti-
tutions in mediating between the two terms of the equation.
Keywords: Environmental change; resource scarcity; violent conflict; insti-
tutions; statehood. 
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22.1 Introduction
In 2007, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) pub-
lished a report entitled “World in Transition: Climate Change as a Secu-
rity Risk” (WBGU 2007). Drawing on the alarming figures published by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the same year, 
it argued that without resolute counteraction, climate change would signifi-
cantly increase the stress put on various societies, particularly in so-called 
weak and fragile states. This, in turn, could provoke destabilisation and vio-
lence and thereby jeopardise national and international security. As a coun-
termeasure, the report suggested an ambitious global climate policy. Other-
wise, it continued, climate change could trigger distributional conflicts and 
intensify the erosion of social order and the rise of violence. Such clear-cut 
statements are of high political saliency. In spring 2008, for example, the 
EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Xavier Solana, 
and the European Commission published a joint paper on climate change 
and international security for the attention of the European Council, that is, 
the heads of state or government of EU member states (European Council 
2008). The paper builds on the same logic as the WBGU report, according 
to which the evidence provided by the IPCC about the increased rapidity of 
climatic and environmental changes provides clear guidance not only for 
climate policy, but for peacebuilding as well.
As important as environmental awareness with respect to observed cli-
mate change may be, the conclusions drawn in such studies raise two major 
issues. First, the link that is established between environmental transforma-
tion (including resource scarcity) and violent conflicts needs to be ques-
tioned critically on the basis of empirical evidence. Even the direction of the 
correlation should be challenged: scarcity might well be more an effect than 
a cause of conflict. The second issue concerns the measures to be adopted 
in order to mitigate the diagnosed security risks. The solutions put forward 
by the WBGU harbour the danger of narrowing a whole set of societal prob-
lems down to environmental issues. A salient example which led to many 
controversies was provided by a contribution of United Nations Secretary 
General Ban Ki Moon to the Washington Post in June 2007, in which he 
established a direct link between ecological degradation and the Darfur cri-
sis (Ban Ki Moon 2007). Does this mean that the perpetrators of massacres 
mainly react to environmental threats? And does it also mean that a success-
ful global climate policy would ultimately contribute to mitigating conflicts 
such as the one in Darfur?
453
The Missing Link: Environmental Change, Institutions, and Violent Conflicts
Drawing on research conducted within the Swiss National Centre of Com-
petence in Research (NCCR) North-South programme,3 the present article 
sheds new light on this debate. One of the main conclusions to be drawn 
from the body of academic work presented below is that seeing the environ-
ment as a direct cause of violent conflict is politically opportunistic, and that 
it can have potentially disastrous consequences for the efforts undertaken by 
politicians, peacebuilders, and peace researchers to reduce violent conflicts 
and their effects. The issue here is not to refute a priori the idea that climate 
change, and especially resource scarcity, could lead to violent conflict. What 
we maintain instead is that, when trying to understand the relationships 
between changes in the environment and violent conflict, it is crucial to put 
social and human dimensions at the centre of the analysis. Climate change 
may render human interaction and social regulation more difficult, but it will 
hardly ever directly affect the probability of violence. Climate policy will 
not bring about peace any more than peace policy will improve the climate. 
In other words, the missing link in current debates about environmental con-
flicts is the key role played by political, social, and cultural institutions in 
mediating between the two terms of the equation.
To support our argument, we proceed in three steps: we first briefly reca-
pitulate debates on environmental conflicts and set out the approach taken in 
the NCCR North-South case studies. We then move on to present some key 
insights drawn from case studies on water and land issues. The article con-
cludes by highlighting the importance of institutional regimes and the state, 
thus sketching new research perspectives around the issue of statehood.
22.2  From environmental security to natural resource 
use conflicts
The debate on the link between the environment and security dates from the 
final phase of the Cold War. In the wake of ecological disasters such as the 
1986 Tchernobyl nuclear accident, drought and desertification in the Sahel 
belt, and debates in Western Europe about the possible death of forests, the 
environment began to be seen as a potential threat to international security. 
Reflection and research on how to ensure the security of states moved from 
an exclusive concern with protection against nuclear weapons to protection 
of the environment itself.
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Since then, a number of research programmes have been launched in order 
to study and, if possible, ‘measure’ the links between environmental degra-
dation and the occurrence of violent conflicts worldwide. This was the case, 
for instance, with Thomas Homer-Dixon and his Canada-based team (Hom-
er-Dixon 1994, 1999) and the Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) 
team led by Günther Baechler and Kurt Spillmann (Baechler 1994, 1998). 
These two teams differed in their theoretical backgrounds and terminology. 
However, they both sought, on the basis of aggregated empirical evidence 
from a number of case studies, to establish causal links between environ-
mental degradation, increased scarcity of renewable natural resources, and 
the occurrence of violent conflicts, with a particular focus on developing 
and transition countries.
Both groups came to similar conclusions, showing that resource scarcity and 
environmental degradation alone were rarely a direct cause of violent con-
flicts. But both also added that environmental degradation combined with 
other triggering factors such as socio-economic, ethnic, or social inequal-
ities could, and in many cases did, contribute to such conflicts.4 In other 
words, a consensus was gradually reached that conflicts linked to renew-
able natural resources such as land and water could not be traced back to a 
single explanatory factor such as environmental degradation, but that they 
depended on a plurality of social, political, economic, and environmental 
factors. More than a decade after these early studies were published, the 
link between environmental degradation and conflict remains elusive and 
difficult to ascertain on the basis of empirical evidence, despite widespread 
claims to the contrary asserted in popular discourse, in the media, and in 
scientifically based publications such as the latest report of the IPCC (Breit-
meier 2009; Gleditsch and Nordås 2009; Take 2009).
22.3  An anthropocentric approach to environmental 
conflicts
It is on this basis that a research project on environmental conflict was elabo-
rated as of 2001 at swisspeace, within the framework of the NCCR North-
South. Rather than reopening the debate about the causality between natural 
resources and conflict, the project set out to analyse and understand how, in 
situations of environmental stress, potential conflicts over natural resourc-
es were managed by local and international actors (Goetschel and Péclard 
2006). To do so, a shift in perspective “from environmentally induced con-
455
The Missing Link: Environmental Change, Institutions, and Violent Conflicts
flicts to natural resource use conflicts” was suggested (Hagmann 2005, 
p 21, emphasis by authors of the present paper). This implied that issues 
such as resource scarcity and environmental degradation had to be analysed 
(1) in the context of social and political relations between the user groups 
concerned, (2) in relation to the role of institutions set up to manage resource 
use patterns, and (3) by taking into account the social and cultural rationale 
of groups involved in natural resource management and/or conflicts (ibid., 
pp 21‒22).
This research agenda was implemented in a number of case studies in the 
Horn of Africa as well as in Central and Southeast Asia, with a focus on 
renewable natural resources such as water and land. Some of the key find-
ings are briefly summarised below.
22.3.1 Water and politics
The Nile Basin stretches over ten countries and is home to approximately 
160 million people. Water management is related to significant conflict 
potential. With an annual population growth rate of about 2 to 3% in the 
region, there is increasing demographic pressure on water and the risk of a 
growing imbalance between supply and demand is real. Moreover, the com-
peting interests of riparian countries make things even more complicated. 
Relations between Ethiopia, where 86% of the Nile water comes from, and 
Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95% of its water supplies, have thus at 
times been very tense (Mason 2004).
Two joint studies were conducted on this topic. One focused on the upper 
Nile in Ethiopia (Yacob Arsano 2007) while the second concentrated 
on Egypt (Mason 2004). The aim of both studies was to understand how 
to move “from conflict to cooperation” (Mason 2004, title) and thus solve 
“the dilemmas of hydropolitics” (Yacob Arsano 2007, title) which involve, 
on the one hand, inadequate management and unsustainable use of water 
at the national level and, on the other hand, a lack of security and coopera-
tion that is characteristic of the region. Both authors underlined the impor-
tance of linkage strategies in water management and in the prevention of 
conflicts that could arise due to poor management. This concerns, firstly, 
links between the riparian countries, whose destinies are obviously interde-
pendent due to their geographical location and which have great interests in 
collaborating. But, secondly, they also stressed the institutional, economic, 
and environmental links between all countries in the Basin. As Mason puts 
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it, “the problem of international water conflicts is not one of war, but rath-
er unsustainable development resulting from the absence of cooperation” 
(Mason 2004, p xv). Yacob Arsano adds that cooperation needs to take place 
at all levels (local, national, regional) and “not only in the economic, aca-
demic and political fields, but also in the cultural and spiritual ones” (Yacob 
Arsano 2007, p 24).
Against a backdrop of mostly unilateral approaches to the management and 
use of the Nile Basin waters, and in order to deal in a constructive man-
ner with conflicts linked to their use, Mason and Yacob Arsano suggest 
the establishment of a compensation mechanism. This mechanism would 
ensure compensation for the use of water by providing other resources or 
by including the affected populations in decision-making and management 
processes relating to water resources. Implementing such a compensation 
mechanism, as well as including the populations concerned, requires that 
an appropriate institutional set-up be put in place. This must reach beyond 
national borders and take into account existing power mechanisms at the 
local (traditional), national, and regional levels.5 A comparative study on the 
management of water policies in Egypt and Ethiopia (Luzi 2007) provided 
a significant complement to this perspective. It adopted a ‘two-level-game’ 
perspective to conceptualise the interlinkages between domestic and foreign 
policy processes and to identify the range of domestically ratifiable water 
negotiation results. The study shows how the limited connectedness of sec-
toral agencies in both countries leads to fragmented policies. Insufficient 
planning and coordination capacities at the national level reduce the range of 
policy choices available to decision-makers.
Water is a key economic, political, and social issue in Central Asia as well. 
Here, too, there is a strong tendency in research and in development poli-
cies to establish a direct link between water resources and conflict.6 Water 
scarcity is generally seen as the ‘natural’ cause of grievances which, once 
formulated and brought into the political fray by local communities, inevita-
bly lead to violent conflicts. In this perspective, conflicts linked to water are 
considered ‘endemic’, that is resulting from struggles at the local level, or 
as the direct consequence of a degradation of inter-community relationships 
due to lack of water. The resolution of such conflicts is perceived primar-
ily as a technical issue (improving irrigation networks) and a local question 
(creation of mechanisms of common water management at the level of local 
communities).
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Research conducted in the Ferghana Valley, in the Syr Daria Basin between 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, shows the limits of such an 
approach (Bichsel 2009). The very concept of water scarcity is critically 
questioned: Scarcity is not just an ‘objective’ issue, as it is generally consid-
ered, especially by development agencies active in the region. Scarcity is the 
result of power relations; the ways in which the stakeholders concerned per-
ceive problems of access to and distribution of drinking or irrigation water, 
as well as the strategies they pursue (or do not pursue!) in order to solve 
those problems, must be contextualised. Besides, regarding these conflicts 
as ‘endemic’ is problematic. On the one hand, this generally leads to a pri-
mordialist vision in which the communities in question appear as homoge-
neous, whereas in reality they are, on the contrary, complex political socie-
ties with many lines of conflict. On the other hand, these conflicts are not 
only restricted to the local sphere.
Consequently, the responses of national and international actors to the 
problem of water distribution in the Ferghana Valley have often not been 
adequate. Firstly, the ‘technicist’ option, which consists in trying to prevent 
or solve water-related conflicts by simply improving distribution networks 
and the way they are managed by local communities, tends to ‘depoliti-
cise’ problems that are, in fact, highly political by turning them into ‘sim-
ple’ issues of technical and community development.7 Secondly, the role of 
power relationships at the local level, albeit crucial, tends to be ignored or 
underestimated. These power relationships are reflected in the importance 
given to the various judicial systems at the national, regional, and local 
levels. Very often, the national legal framework does not correspond to the 
daily life of local populations and does not make sense to them. Finally, 
the people and groups concerned do not necessarily adhere to the model of 
‘harmony’ which external actors try to impose in order to solve conflicts that 
they believe they have discovered.
In other words, water in itself is rarely a cause of conflict. Rather, it is a ter-
rain upon which other types of social and political conflicts or oppositions 
are played out. Understanding these conflicts and devising appropriate strat-
egies to address them requires in-depth analyses of their historical, social, 
cultural, and political dynamics. This means looking far beyond the borders 
of the communities involved in the conflict. It also means that one has to 
understand the way in which the societies in question have been shaped by 
these very conflicts.
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22.3.2  Land and conflict
Conflicts linked to the use and management of land have been studied 
from different angles and perspectives and in a wide variety of historical 
and geographical contexts. In this case as well, research results have shown 
quite clearly that, in order to understand the dynamics of these conflicts and 
devise strategies of intervention, it does not suffice simply to look for a link 
between the issue of access to and use of land on the one hand, and the occur-
rence of tensions potentially leading to violent conflicts on the other. Many 
other variables need to be taken into account as well.
Research on pastoral conflict and resource management in Ethiopia (Hag-
mann 2006) thus underlined the central but initially unexpected role of the 
state in shaping pastoral conflict and resource management in frontier areas 
such as Ethiopia’s Somali region. Before the establishment of local govern-
ment in pastoral lowlands, resource conflicts were primarily driven by com-
petition over water wells and pastures. With the advent of decentralisation, 
numerous state or state-related resources have been brought into play. As 
evidenced by the NCCR North-South research, employment in the public 
sector, political nominations, state budgets, and basic government services 
such as education, food aid, security, and many others have become contest-
ed resources. They provide an incentive for political competition, fuel inter-
group tensions, and transform existing conflict dynamics, which become 
intertwined with control of state office. In parallel with the ‘trickling down’ 
of state resources into remote rural areas, neo-patrimonial relations between 
resource users and state representatives are being established. These rela-
tions and networks tie rural constituencies to urban gatekeepers, determine 
the allocation of state resources, and assure politicians of electoral support 
on election day. By means of this process, state-building has politicised kin-
ship relations and reconfigured the collective identities of pastoral groups 
(Hagmann and Alemmaya Mulugeta 2008).
Focusing on the potential of local institutions in conflict transformation in 
pastoral areas of Ethiopia, further research has shown that the often-stat-
ed argument according to which local institutions have deteriorated and 
strengthening their role will help to mitigate violent conflicts in pastoral 
areas, is often misleading (Alemmaya Mulugeta 2010). Indeed, Alemma-
ya Mulugeta shows that the dichotomy between local institutions and state 
institutions exists only in theory. Whether formally or non-formally estab-
lished, local institutions remain alive at the level of social narrative and pub-
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lic ideology, and thus play a very important role in shaping the history of 
the respective community. However, the state has recently claimed the role 
played by local institutions in terms of conflict mitigation on the ground, 
even though it lacks the capacity to do so for both structural and political rea-
sons. On the structural level, state institutions usually lack the resources that 
would enable them to understand how and why violence occurs in specific 
places. On the political level, the main problem is that the state itself is often 
heavily involved in instigating violence, which of course makes it impos-
sible for it to play the role of a neutral actor in conflict resolution processes 
(Alemmaya Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). Moreover, Alemmaya Mulug-
eta argues that the roots of violence cannot be fully understood by looking 
solely at actors directly engaged in violence itself, but that other ‘invisible’ 
actors such as investors, businessmen, and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that act as apparently neutral parties or play a developmental role 
should also be taken into account (Alemmaya Mulugeta 2010).
The issue of land distribution is of central relevance as well, as research in 
South Asia (India and Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Philippines, Indone-
sia) has shown. In this case, the focus was on the relationships between set-
tlers and indigenous populations regarding access to land ownership, espe-
cially in border zones (in a social as well as geographical sense). The arrival 
of settlers in such areas, whether as part of a state scheme or on their own ini-
tiative, generally gives rise to tensions between settlers and indigenous com-
munities, who feel threatened by the newcomers. Violent conflicts that arise 
from such situations usually crystallise around the issue of ‘indigenous-
ness’, creating anti-immigrant discourses and practices based on the right of 
‘autochthons’ to dispose of their land. In such cases it would be simplistic to 
reduce the dynamics of conflict to the question of access to land resources 
or to the lack of land due to the arrival of settlers. Here as well, conflicts are 
not just ‘environmental’ but are the result of constellations of conflicts with 
different origins and rationales (ethnic, political, social, economic, cultural, 
etc.). Any attempt at mediation in such conflicts must take this complexity 
into account (Geiger 2008). 
The issue of land titling on the island of Mindanao, Philippines, shows just 
how complex and ambivalent intervention strategies are. In 1997, the gov-
ernment passed the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), a bill without 
comparison throughout Southeast Asia in terms of protecting indigenous 
people. By granting indigenous communities the right to claim – and obtain 
– ownership to their land, this law indeed introduced an apparently powerful 
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instrument for the protection of indigenous minorities. On closer examina-
tion, however, things are not as simple as they appear. IPRA is in fact part of 
a hegemonic strategy of the Filipino state, which tries to extend its control 
to ‘frontier zones’ – where its presence is very scant and its power heavily 
questioned – through the introduction of a bureaucratic logic of classifying 
peoples and groups, and through the titling of land. What appears at first 
sight as an efficient measure of protecting ethnic minorities is in fact also, or 
primarily, an instrument of state control (Wenk 2005). 
The central contribution of these different studies has thus been to dem-
onstrate the crucial importance of the human factor in so-called ‘environ-
mental conflicts’. The key to prevention and resolution of such conflicts, 
therefore, does not lie in technical interventions that only aim to address 
the environmental causes (e.g. combating drought) or to improve resource 
distribution and circulation (e.g. through better irrigation and water distri-
bution networks or by improving access to land), but in the human, social, 
political, economic, and cultural management of the resources concerned. 
This anthropocentric approach to resource use conflicts, by putting individ-
uals and social groups at the centre of analysis, also aims to understand the 
institutional dimensions of conflict and to assess the potential that institu-
tions – be they customary, community-based, or part of the state apparatus 
– have in terms of conflict prevention and resolution. 
22.4  Conclusion: Bringing institutions and states 
back in
With the publication of the WBGU report in 2007, the debate on environ-
mental conflicts has come full circle, since the security implications of cli-
mate change are seen in much the same way as when the issue made its 
entrance on the international scene at the end of the Cold War. In this context, 
it is particularly important to move from a strictly ‘environment-centred’ to 
a ‘human-centred’ approach. 
This move allows us, first of all, to pay due attention to the way in which 
existing institutional mechanisms of conflict prevention in the societies 
concerned can contribute to ‘environmental peacebuilding’ (Péclard 2009). 
It also helps to understand how, paradoxically, such institutions can have 
negative effects on efforts to solve conflicts, especially in contexts where, 
as in the Ethiopian lowlands, their role is being challenged by state institu-
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tions that lack the practical means to intervene (Alemmaya Mulugeta and 
Hagmann 2008). Furthermore, natural resources such as water and land are 
embedded in a wider system of resources (symbolic and material), and insti-
tutions are, of course, central not only in regulating access to them, but also 
in mitigating potential conflicts related to them. This applies even more in 
cases of international tensions or conflicts, as has been shown in the research 
on the Nile Basin mentioned above (Mason 2004; Yacob Arsano 2007; Luzi 
2008). Whether or not resource scarcity is likely to actually lead to conflict 
depends largely on the way the institutions concerned deal with the issue. 
They are much better equipped to solve or transform potential conflicts if 
they have a clear approach to resource allocation, if they can adapt to chang-
ing political and environmental conditions, and if they can promote posi-
tive-sum solutions to resource problems and incorporate structural conflict 
resolution mechanisms (Giordano et al 2005, p 61). 
Focusing on the institutional dimension of environmental conflicts is there-
fore another way of taking full account of the inherently political nature 
of these conflicts (Hagmann 2005; Bichsel 2009). Indeed, they cannot be 
understood without taking into account wider processes of social and politi-
cal change at the local as well as global levels. As the example of the Ethiopi-
an lowlands mentioned above (Hagmann 2006; Alemmaya Mulugeta 2010) 
clearly demonstrates, conflicts over access to land, pastures, or water are 
often the result of struggles for power within a particular context rather than 
a consequence of the scarcity of the resource itself. In this sense, natural 
resources are as much instruments of political struggle as its ultimate objec-
tive or goal. 
This is a further reason why institutions in general, and in particular state 
institutions, need to be brought back to the centre of analysis. Firstly, natural 
resources themselves, as well as the modes of social regulation that have 
developed around the use of such resources, are central to the political and 
economic basis of states. The dynamics of state formation are deeply inter-
twined with availability of and control over natural resources. Secondly, 
the definition and management of property rights, as well as the capacity to 
regulate access to natural resources, depend largely on the capacity of states 
to put in place a working judicial system and on the ways in which this sys-
tem interacts with other judicial orders, especially at the local (community) 
level. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the state itself is a material as 
well as symbolic resource that directly influences the way in which potential 
conflicts over the environment actually develop. This was already the case 
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in colonial Africa, where control over land, for instance, usually went hand 
in hand with the emergence of the social groups that eventually formed the 
backbone of the post-colonial state (Boone 2003). This is also very clear-
ly illustrated by the consequences of the politics of ethnic federalism and 
decentralisation adopted in Ethiopia since 1991 (Hagmann 2006), or in post-
Soviet Central Asia (Bichsel 2009).
And herein lies another risk of oversimplification in current debates about 
the effects of climate change. One of the underlying assumptions of cata-
strophist discourses on the risk of violent conflicts as a consequence of cli-
mate change is that the effects of increased scarcity of natural resources will 
hit so-called ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ states much harder than others. As we have 
shown here, properly functioning institutions do have a critical role to play 
in the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of violent conflicts, and accord-
ingly, institutionally stable states can be an asset in the context of environ-
mental stress. However, the ‘fragile state’ discourse is a strongly normative 
one which does not allow for understanding of the dynamics of state forma-
tion and the ways in which power relations are institutionalised in particular 
settings. Indeed, states are identified as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or even ‘failed’ 
and ‘collapsed’ “not by what they are, but by what they are not, namely, suc-
cessful in comparison to Western states” (Hill 2005, p 148). In the context of 
climate change, it is therefore crucial to analyse how issues such as the regu-
lation of access to natural resources, the distribution of land and pastures, the 
availability of fresh water through distribution networks, or even the shar-
ing of international waters are embedded in dynamics of power distribution 
and institutionalisation. In other words, the environment is but one resource 
among many others for which social actors strive and struggle, rather than 
the ultimate cause of violence in contexts of resource scarcity, as the reports 
of the IPCC and of the WBGU seem to imply. Finally, it should be investi-
gated how the environment is embedded in processes of ‘negotiating state-
hood’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010), that is, in social and political struggles 
for control over the regulation of social life, at the local and global levels. 
Directing the focus, as we are suggesting, on issues of governance and insti-
tutional settings when dealing with so-called environmental conflicts has 
implications for research, of course, but also for the policies of internation-
al actors such as the United Nations. Indeed, in the United Nations system 
there is a strong tendency to separate environmental from political issues – 
or even worse, to reduce politics to ecology as mentioned above in the intro-
duction.8 Against this tendency, the research perspective we have synthe-
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sised here underlines the primary importance of the modes of interaction and 
governance chosen by the parties concerned themselves. There is no empiri-
cal evidence that the need for multiple parties to accommodate their joint use 
of renewable natural resources such as land or water will more often lead to 
violent conflicts than to cooperation. If violence occurs, its causes have to 
be sought also in the human, social, and political dimensions of the conflict 
in question, and not solely in its ecological aspects. Similarly, peacebuilding 
strategies and modes of intervention devised with a view to mitigating such 
conflicts need to focus on what is so often the ‘missing link’ in the debate: on 
the institutional dimension. 
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